1960 - 1966: South Africa under Verwoerd

   1960 can be seen as a turning point for South Africa, both at home and on the world stage.  The premiership of Verwoerd entered its third year, and with it increasing confidence to push forward his ideological aims of independence from Britain and separate development.  His leadership was characterised by a brutal suppression of dissent - between 1962 and 1965, for example, the length of time an individual could be imprisoned without charge rose from 12 days to 180; the use of the death penalty was expanded for crimes such as sabotage; and African resistance groups including the African National Congress (ANC) were harshly suppressed. 

   Still a dominion of the British Empire by 1960, South Africa's principal foreign relationship was therefore with Britain.  In 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan delivered his 'Wind of Change' speech to the South African parliament, where he hinted at an end for British neutrality on Apartheid if South Africa continued to stand against the trend towards African rights.  Macmillan, to quote Barber, "unearthed the fears, stripped away the illusions of unquestioning western support."[1]  However, Davenport and Saunders are more critical of Macmillan, interpreting his stance as that of 'continued friendship' and a commitment not to participate in sanctions against South Africa.[2]  Verwoerd's response was defiant, rejecting Macmillan's interpretation of Apartheid policies and reiterating the government's standpoint.

   Less than two months after Macmillan's speech, 69 Africans protesting against pass laws were killed by South African police in the Sharpeville Massacre.  This drew worldwide anger and was condemned by the UN Security Council's Resolution 134.  Britain and France abstained in this vote, indicating that while they were not willing to actively oppose Apartheid, they could no longer condone it.  The South African government had previously interpreted the UN's charter as forbidding actions which aimed to change the domestic policies of a country, but Hopkins argues that the UN's reaction to the killings made it clear this was no longer the case[3]. 

   Despite universal agreement in the UN that Apartheid should be opposed, there was a limited will to do so.  Stultz accuses the UN as experiencing a "stalemate" over South Africa.[4]  Although anti-Apartheid resolutions could easily pass in the General Assembly, these lacked the force of international law and were merely gestures of world opinion.  Only the Security Council could pass legally binding resolutions but Britain, France and the USA's status as permanent members allowed them to veto drafts calling for direct action which threatened South Africa's role as a trading partner and ally.  Resolutions were subsequently watered down, using words such as 'condemns' and 'deplores'[5] while avoiding any language which could be interpreted to sanction action.  A Special Committee on Apartheid was set up in 1962, which "issued a steady stream of publications exposing and denouncing the effects of South Africa's racial policies."[6]  However Stultz has criticised this for being a "weak enterprise," containing only eleven member states.[7]  Rather than act to stem this shift in international perceptions through concessions, the South African government responded by doubting the UN's legitimacy to make such judgements and accused it of bias. 

   Although counterproductive forces in the UN, Britain and the USA did take some measures to oppose Apartheid, most notably the decision in 1964 to cease selling arms to South Africa which could be used on its own citizens.  This was a result of hostility towards Apartheid in the wake of the Rivonia Trial, which had received much media attention[8] and was seen in the West as a further oppressive action.  The campaigning of Oliver Tambo as ANC President in exile also had an influence on this rare decision to take action.  However, the arms ban is unlikely to have had an effect while South Africa could still purchase weapons from alternative sources.  The British were also reliant on South Africa in the form of their strategic naval base in Simonstown, and fear that the South African government might cancel the Simonstown agreement prevented the introduction of more extreme opposition measures.[9]  Action from the USA was limited; African Americans faced segregation in the early 1960s, so the US government had little moral authority to criticise South Africa.  On the occasions it did, Klotz refers to this as a 'hypocrisy'.[10] 

   Communist countries proved more willing to support African resistance groups than Western countries.  The radicalisation of African resistance groups, most significantly Umkonto we Sizwe within the ANC, resulted in calls to supply these groups with arms.  These calls had fallen on deaf ears in Western countries.  Tambo consequently decided to seek military assistance from the Soviet Union.  Considering the state of fear and paranoia among Western countries against Communism during the Cold War, this decision made Western governments more hesitant to oppose Apartheid and reinforced South African propaganda that it was a vital member in the struggle against Communism[11].  Communist support for liberation movements was weakened as a result of the Sino-Soviet Split in 1961, resulting in the ANC being supplied by the Soviet Union and the Pan-Africanist Congress by China.  These groups were often in competition, so divisions between Communist countries reduced the potential threat armed groups could pose to South Africa.

   The greatest long-term threat to White dominance in South Africa was the decolonisation movement which swept through the continent during the 1960s.  By 1966, 37 African countries had been granted independence by their former colonial powers since 1945.  Their collective influence in the UN ensured that anti-Apartheid resolutions would always be adopted in the General Assembly.  However, South Africa was separated from these new countries by a barrier of White states, including Namibia, Portuguese Angola and Mozambique and Rhodesia (see Appendix A on page 24).  Rhodesia and Portugal received harsh international opposition, often in the form of sanctions, diverting attention and criticism away from South Africa.  The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, worked towards establishing African rule in South Africa.  Barber praises the role of the new African states, commenting they "brought new life" to the movement and helped shift international opinion against Apartheid.[12]  Zunes is more critical, arguing that militant opposition failed because of military weaknesses; even a combined African military force could not have successfully invaded South Africa[13].  The OAU was forced to use economic strategies to put pressure on South Africa, such as reducing trade where practical and limiting air links.[14]  As South Africa's economy grew, its African neighbours became increasingly dependent and less able to form an opposition.  By 1966, despite victories for African nationalists across the continent, South Africa faced no serious threat from the independent African countries.

   Although there was a universal shift of international consensus on Apartheid towards condemnation and opposition between 1960 and 1966, this was rarely reflected through action.  Western nations still largely accepted Apartheid to protect their economic and strategic interests, holding back progress in the UN.  Only the Communist countries provided real opposition, in the form of support for African resistance groups. 

---

[1] Barber, James., 1999. South Africa in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. p. 163.

[2] Davenport, Rodney. & Saunders, Christopher., 2000. South Africa: A Modern History. 5th ed. Macmillan Press. p. 522.

[3] Hopkins, Kevin., 2001. Assessing the World's Response to Apartheid: A Historical Account of International Law and its Part in the South African Transformation. [online]. p. 251.

[4] Stultz, Newell M., 1991. Evolution of the United Nations Anti-Apartheid Regime. [online]. p. 12.

[5] UN Security Council. 1964. Resolution 191 (1964) of 18 June 1964. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1538.html [accessed 24 February 2013]

[6] Thompson, Leonard., 2001. A History of South Africa. 3rd ed. Yale Nota Bene. p. 214.

[7] Stultz. 1991. Evolution of the United Nations Anti-Apartheid Regime. p. 10.

[8] South Africa History Online., n.d. Reactions, the Impact of the Trial [online] Available at:  http://www.sahistory.org.za/rivonia-trial-lilliesleaf-farm-1963-64/reactions-impact-trial [Accessed 02 February 2013].

[9] Barber, James., 1973. South Africa’s Foreign Policy 1945-1970. Oxford University Press. p. 288

[10] Klotz, Audie., 1995. Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa. International organisation [online]. p. 462.

[11] Thompson. 2001. A History of South Africa. p. 215.

[12] Barber, James., 1973. South Africa’s Foreign Policy 1945-1970. p. 143.

[13] Zunes, Stephen., 1999. The Role of Non-Violent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 140

[14] Edgar, Robert E. (ed), 1990. Sanctioning Apartheid. Africa World Press. p. 269.